Treaty. 1 The decision not to ratify rests on the fact that the Treaty does not include the participation of developing countries. If China, Brazil and India are not included in the solution, many believe that efforts by the developed world could be eclipsed and become futile. Further, some argue that compliance would damage the American economy; some economic models predict a drag on GDP of nearly two percent (while other models predict an equal sized boost.
2 )
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the rationale to withdraw from Kyoto, one thing is certain. While many within the business community dislike the Kyoto Protocol, viewing it as a suboptimal mechanism for bringing about a business solution to this problem, policy-makers have created what businesses dislike even more -uncertainty.
Companies need a clear picture of future market environments in order to make strategic decisions; and the decision not to ratify the Kyoto Treaty has only been made the future market environment cloudier.
But interestingly, some U.S. companies also see an opportunity in this situation.
They are taking advantage of the present lack of a mandatory U.S. GHG emission reduction program to set targets at their own pace and in their own way; a way that fits with their own strategic objectives. Often by drawing off the expertise of industry 3 with net revenues of roughly $1.5 trillion, 4 have set reduction targets. And hundreds more are considering such steps.
In point of fact, many of these companies are agnostic about the science of climate change or the social responsibility of protecting the global climate. The reasons that they are making these emission reductions are decidedly strategic. They are searching for ways to be prepared for the long term should GHG emission reductions become mandatory, while at the same time attempting to reap near term economic and strategic benefits should that future not emerge or be delayed. At a time when even some industry groups are pushing for corporate action on climate change -notably, the Conference Board warned that "businesses that ignore the debate over climate change do so at their peril," 5 -many forward thinking U.S. companies have decided that it is in their best interests to hedge their strategic bets, preparing for either scenario. Using examples of specific business actions, this paper will assess a series of ways in which this is being done.
Business Logic and Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reductions.
The strategic reasons for adopting voluntary GHG reductions are as varied as the companies that are undertaking them. These companies range in size from $350 million in annual sales to $186 billion. Some are multi-national corporations; others are primarily U.S. based in their market scope. Some are public, others are private and still others are government owned. They are from industry sectors as diverse as oil, pharmaceuticals and financial services. Some have adopted modest goals (e.g. one percent reduction in GHGs per year over four years) while others have adopted more aggressive goals (e.g. twentyfive percent reduction from 1990 levels by 2011). 6 Some are relative newcomers in their efforts 7 while others have been working on them for years. 8 In order to understand these initiatives, we must begin by shifting our view of controls on GHG emissions from a strictly environmental issue driven by regulatory or social pressures to a strategic issue driven by market pressures. Greenhouse gas controls represent a market transition; one not unlike those that have occurred in the past where consumer needs change or technology advances. In such circumstances, companies face new competitive environments where some will decline while others rise to fill their place. The typewriter industry was virtually eliminated by the computer in the early 1980s; the compact disc replaced the phonograph album in the mid-1980s; the 1984 dissolution of the Bell System wrought structural changes in the telecommunications industry. 9 Climate change will present just such a transition. But unlike these other market shifts, climate change represents a transition of a fairly new and unusual kind. In regions where Kyoto is ratified, it amounts to the establishment of a new world-wide market in pollution, pollution credits, capital and emissions abatement technology. So, companies that are adept at (a) reducing their GHG emissions by altering products or processes, (b) trading in emission credits so as to capitalize on this new commodity market or (c) developing and marketing new management skills or technologies that produce less greenhouse gases will find advantage in the emerging climate change market transition.
And in regions where Kyoto remains unratified, companies may still find themselves in an altered landscape, as their competitors, suppliers, buyers, consumers, investors and government adopt concerns for GHG reductions either because they operate in ratified regions or because they see a proactive stance in GHG reductions as wise business strategy.
In either case, the key to financially successful emissions reductions requires an assessment of a company's strategic positioning vis-à-vis GHG emissions. implications. There will be winners and losers; those with an interest in resisting and trying to delay such a market transformation and those who will try to capitalize on it.
The difference between these two groups lies in a careful cost/benefit analysis of doing something versus doing nothing. Not all companies will benefit from GHG reductions and voluntary reduction programs must be based on sound business logic. They must have a bottom line rationale or such efforts will be financially unsustainable.
Analyzing this bottom line rationale is the direction of the rest of this paper. It will describe how companies have presently sought strategic benefits from voluntary GHG reductions and cluster those efforts in seven different categories: (1) operational improvement, (2) anticipating and influencing climate change regulations, (3) accessing new sources of capital, (4) improving risk management, (5) elevating corporate reputation, (6) identifying new market opportunities, and (7) enhancing human resource management. 10 In each of these categories, new kinds of questions are presented to help companies ascertain their vulnerability under a climate change protocol. Through this analysis, this paper will enjoin the on-going debate over whether it "pays to be green." 11 In many ways, it shows how the question needs to be reframed. The more important questions revolve around first identifying for who being green can pay and then second, how and when they can make that happen.
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1. Operational Improvement.
Within the environmental management literature, there is a great deal of research in the area of pollution prevention. This work has revolved around dematerialization of production processes, 13 optimization of the supply chain logistics, developing more efficient manufacturing processes, 14 utilizing green materials and processes, shifting from products to services in the marketplace 15 and linking companies together within their industrial ecologies. 16 One recurrent theme that runs through these literatures is the identification of managerial and operational biases that shield managers from identifying such opportunities. 17 Traditionally, environmental protection has not been seen as a profit-making opportunity within firms. But when environmental issues are viewed from the perspective of strategic opportunities and framed in traditional economic terms of net present value, return on investment or return on equity, these opportunities become more visible.
In the same line of reasoning, what follows are examples of reductions in GHG emissions that can at times expose opportunities for process optimization that can lower energy costs, reduce material utilization rates, minimize emissions or lower costs of transportation. 18 The key to transferring the opportunities mentioned here into other contexts and settings is careful consideration of the economic costs and benefits of such efforts as they relate to specific internal hurdle rates and the opportunity costs of conducting these initiatives versus other available initiatives. where the amount of dissolved aluminum drops to levels that interfere with operations. In the past this was a way to establish the dissolved alumina in the cell eutectic, since it is impossible to measure the alumina concentration directly in 1000 degree centigrade molten material. This anode effect creates perfluorocarbons, which are potent greenhouse gases. By studying ways to better manage and measure the cell inputs so that anode effects are no longer necessary to establish alumina concentration, the company has been able to better understand how to minimize these events and therefore, create the efficiencies and yield improvements that come from better process control and management. 25 Similarly BP saved $1 million by reducing the flaring of gas emissions at its refineries and was able to reduce another 500,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent in methane by replacing pneumatic valves with electronic ones in pipelines. And by selling the saved methane rather than venting it, the project realized a sixty-seven percent return. for additional savings of $360 million in smog-related expenses. 39 Taking steps already,
Energy cost reductions.
Houston is looking at planting more greenery as a way to reduce the "urban heat island,"
and reduce carbon dioxide and smog levels as well as air-conditioning use. 40 
Anticipating and Influencing Climate Change Regulations.
While regulatory compliance is typically viewed as a cost of doing business, the regulatory terrain of climate change is complex and emerging on many levels. In order to think strategically about climate change regulations, business managers must have a multi-pronged approach. They must be aware of developments in policy standards at the international, national and regional levels; they must be prepared to respond if and when standards emerge; and finally, they must assess whether they can have an influence on the form of what those standards might be. allowances to a Japanese group. 44 The European Union's GHG emissions trading scheme will be introduced in January 2005. 45 And Canada has announced plans to soon follow with its own cap and trade program. 46 And the ranks of countries developing GHG trading schemes continues to grow. In 2002, even China announced that it would ratify Kyoto. 47 Given such developments, multi-national corporations face practical strategic reasons to become familiar with internal GHG measurements, reduction strategies and external trading schemes, given that at least some of their operations will likely find them in a regulated regime. But to be a strategic player in GHG reductions will require a familiarity in GHG emissions measurement and commodity trading, two relatively new areas of expertise. As a result, some companies have created internal GHG trading systems to prepare themselves for potential future regulations. Alcoa, the world's largest aluminum producer has started an internal system for curbing GHG emissions from its businesses around the world. 48 Similarly, Motorola and Waste Management have all adopted internal cap and trade schemes under the assumption that the regulation of greenhouse gases is inevitable. 49 to farmers who sequester carbon in soil. 50 While the bill was defeated, it is significant that the vote was 55-43 against adoption. The last time the Senate voted on such a bill was in 1997 when they voted 95-0 to reject the Kyoto Protocol. 51 Bills proposing regulatory schemes will likely evolve towards a form that will satisfy policy makers.
Towards that end, the bill's sponsors vow to press on and have been able to gain bipartisan as well as industry and NGO support for their efforts. 
Accessing New Sources of Capital.
Directly related to the issue of GHG trading schemes is the availability of capital.
For instance, governments are entering such schemes by introducing financial incentives to reduce GHGs. The first trade in the British spot market involved an auction for £215 million in financial incentives from the government. 62 It is estimated that the reduction would have cost £247 million in the absence of trading 63 and the thirty-four companies that bought the credits (including Shell, BP, DuPont, ICI, Blue Circle, Tesco, British
Airways and the Natural History Museum) agreed to cut their emissions by more than four million tons over five years in return for £53.37 per ton. 64 One of the participants, DuPont (which took over ICI's nylon producing plan in Wilton, Cleveland, UK) reduced emissions of nitrous oxide, a GHG that is 310 times more potent than carbon dioxide, by developing a process that safely broke down the compound into nitrogen and oxygen which can be safely released into the atmosphere. The abatement equipment cost £6 million, and the company hopes to receive £26.7 million from the British government in compensation. 65 Since then, the company installed the technology into its plants worldwide, cutting GHG emissions by 60 million tons a year. 66 In similar examples, the Dutch government has been paying about $10 a ton for GHG reductions in its recent market-trading scheme. And the World Bank's Prototype Carbon Fund will give credits to companies that help developing countries shift to technology that reduces carbon dioxide emissions. The credits would be valid, tradable, financial instruments.
Becoming even more creative, some jurisdictions are holding "reverse auctions,"
where a national or local agency declares that they have a fixed amount of money to "buy" GHG reductions. Entities such as companies, power stations, and farmers then bid on how much GHG they can deliver at that price. The agency then sorts the bids and takes the most cost effective ones in terms of GHG reductions for the price. 67 So, the company that is able to generate GHG reductions at the lowest price stands to yield dividends for its efforts.
Those dividends could come from governments at the outset, but will likely come more from interfirm trading as the Kyoto Treaty goes into effect. How much money is at stake here? Richard Sandor, chairman of the Chicago Climate Exchange, estimates the market could be as large as the $5 billion annual market for sulfur dioxide. 68 The World
Bank foresees a $10 billion market in GHG emissions by 2006. 69 CO2e.com estimates the range from $10 billion to $3 trillion by 2010. 70 Others estimate it could be as large as $100 billion per year after the treaty goes into effect. 71 There are, of course, contingencies on these size estimates that must be weighed into any climate change strategy. One contingency is the inclusion of carbon sinks and the exclusion of trade ceilings, which send conflicting signals through the market.
Demand for carbon is bolstered (prices raised) by the Kyoto Protocol's lack of an explicit ceiling on the number of credits that countries can buy to meet their targets. But also, demand is reduced (prices lowered) because Russia, Japan and Canada have been awarded substantial allowances from the carbon stored in forests towards their emissions reductions. 72 Other contingencies rest on who participates. According to the research group, Climate Strategies, the market will be about $9 billion with the assumption that the EU, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are potential buyers of credits. And the size of this market would increase substantially if the U.S. were to join the group of potential buyers. The right to emit one metric ton of carbon dioxide now sells for $3 to $8 according to Jack Cogen, chief executive at Natsource. If American companies do finally join, the price of permits will go up due to increased demand. 73 But, until they do, the absence of U.S. participation from the market for credits can limit strategic benefits for domestic interests. Many American companies will find it hard to buy or sell credits with companies under the Kyoto regime. 74 For example, Canada, which had been buying large volumes of American emissions reductions in recent years, scaled back since it became clear the American reductions would not be compliant with Kyoto. 75 If the U.S. does not ratify the treaty, credits sold to companies in participating countries could not be counted towards their Kyoto targets. 76 To hedge this bet, companies have been searching ways for registering their reductions such as through the Department of Energy's GHG registry.
Improving Risk Management.
Greenhouse gas reductions can become an opportunity to reduce financial risks.
According to the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies, there are presently $7.4 trillion of corporate assets that could be threatened by climate change. 77 This leads the group to conclude that corporate board members and senior executives (as well as institutional investors) can no longer ignore such costs and would be negligent in their fiscal responsibilities should they do so. These risks can be categorized into two domains.
Natural consequences. The first category is the risks associated with the damages and remediation due to climate change itself (as a result of droughts, floods and hurricanes). In the U.S., these damages have been on the rise. In 1998, weather related disasters such as fires, floods, storms and droughts caused approximately $89 billion in economic losses globally. This surpassed the previous record of $60 billion in 1996. 78 And some insurers are worrying that climate change could cause substantial losses in the years ahead. While the economic costs have not been totally calculated yet, the hurricane damages of 2004 stand to break another record.
In the face of such developments, Swiss Re, a large multi-national insurance company reported that "The more quickly and radically the global climate changes, the more extreme weather patterns could cause damage which not only pose a threat to individual citizens, families and enterprises but could also jeopardize whole cities and branches of the economy and -on a global scale -entire states and social systems. In brief: damage which had better not be risked because it can no longer be handled." 79 Even the Pentagon has speculated that climate change could have serious economic implications by causing droughts which cripple farms and devastate forests; in some scenarios even destabilizing present geo-political arrangements. 80 Swiss Re estimates that global warming could cost $300 billion annually by 2050 in weather damage, pollution, industrial and agricultural losses and other expenses. These costs vary by region of the world (as shown in table 1) and by sector. Real estate, for example, will be affected by coastal flooding while timber and farming will be affected by droughts.
Insert table 1 here
Financial consequences. The second category of risk is that associated with the costs of greenhouse emissions under a mandatory GHG mitigation scheme. Companies could face unexpected expenses with regulations, fines, taxes and caps on products and processes that produce greenhouse gases. Some estimate the total exposure of the electricity utility industry alone to carbon dioxide controls at more than $60 billion annually.
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So, many feel that they must prepare their companies today for any regulations tomorrow. Cinergy, for example, has seventy-five percent of its physical assets and as much as ninety-seven percent of its energy generation coming from coal (the rest coming from natural gas). To ignore the possibility of carbon restrictions would be fiscally irresponsible. To protect its assets, the company has decided to make reductions today based on their assessment of where policy may head using barometers such as the McCain-Leiberman bill that was voted down in Congress. 82 Such business realities have led to a push for more public disclosure on GHG and consumers who may purchase a company's products or services.
But gaining reputational advantage from climate change is difficult given the public's uncertain thinking on the issue. On the one hand, a Zogby poll found that seventy-five percent of 1,200 Americans polled supported the idea of requiring major industries to reduce their GHG emissions. 85 On the other hand, an NEETF survey found that most Americans are fairly illiterate when it comes to environmental issues. For example, a majority of the public think (incorrectly) that the majority of our energy is produced in non-air polluting ways such as hydro-electric power and only one in three sees coal burning as an issue. 86 (In actuality, coal is the primary source of electric power in this country, producing more than fifty percent of the energy mix and nearly eighty percent of the carbon dioxide within the energy sector. 87 The U.S. alternative power sector produces only about ten percent of the U.S. energy needs.)
The and 2001. The industry has attempted to present a greener image by touting that more than a quarter of aluminum demand is met by recycling, which uses only five percent of the energy needed to make primary aluminum. The motivation for such efforts is often to satisfy or neutralize conflicting interests that may impinge on industry operations. 90 BP has benefited from avoiding such conflicting interests by its highly visible embracement of climate change as a strategic initiative. When John Browne first articulated his vision for the company in 1997, the oil industry ranked at the bottom of most public opinion polls since the early 1990s. 91 In the wake of his announcements and the efforts that followed, the company enjoys high public approval ratings that now translate into more understanding treatment from environmental activists, the government and the press (reporters have been less critical of the company's stands on issues such as drilling in ANWR),.
Identifying New Market Opportunities.
Greenhouse gas reductions can expose important information and insights for guiding new strategic directions. By measuring environmental costs and risks associated with product or process lines and remaining alert to changes in consumer preference, media attention, community concerns and regulatory program trends, companies can exit increasingly risky business areas in favor of more secure options. This can manifest itself in a number of ways.
For example, certain product markets offer opportunities to reduce carbon load and improve market performance. One area with a great deal of activity is bio-materials, which shift the raw material for synthetics away from fossil fuels. DuPont wants to generate twenty-five percent of its revenues from renewable resources by 2010 (the figure in 2003 was fourteen percent). To do this, the company hopes to divest its large, oil based textiles and interiors unit, which makes nylon, polyester and Lycra and instead make clothes from corn (such as Sorona, a new stretchable fabric made from corn). 92 Cargill Dow LLC is also seeking to make "bio-material" products like T-shirts, socks, milk bottles and auto parts out of corn-starch. The company makes a product called NatureWorks PLA which Coca-Cola is using to make soft drink cups, McDonalds is using for salad containers and Pacific Coast Feather is using to fill pillows and comforters. This reduces dependence on oil (an allied driver of climate strategy), reduces GHG production, eliminates toxic materials from the ecosystem, and reduces associated sources. 99 Texas's renewable energy standard has resulted in the biggest wind power construction boom the nation has ever seen. 100 In September 2003, California, Oregon and Washington announced that they will buy cars that emit low levels of carbon dioxide for the use by state employees. 101 The Dutch government has earmarked a million GHG credits for wind farm projects planned by Meridian Energy and TrustPower. 102 Japan and Germany are heavily funding solar roofs to stimulate the market for photovoltaics. France is subsidizing energy audits and counseling people to travel less. Japan is funding research on renewables. Austria is committed to having seventy-eight percent of energy generation from renewables, Sweden sixty percent, Portugal thirty-nine percent, Finland, Spain and Denmark over twenty-five percent. Iceland, rich in thermal energy, has become the first country in the world to make a commitment towards becoming a hydrogen economy and extract energy from water. 103 One brand new market that could be created by GHG trading is carbon sequestration. The Environmental Quality Incentive Program under the 2002 farm bill will pay farmers for converting to no-tillage farming, which traps and stores more carbon.
An average acre of cropland sequesters about 74 tons of carbon. Under alternative techniques, the same acre could sequester between 200 pounds and 1,000 pounds more per year. The price for this activity in the U.S. could be somewhere around $10 an acre.
A carbon market in Europe has already set the price at $8.90 a ton and farmers have been thus far contracted to generate 9,000 tons of carbon every year. While it is unclear exactly how much no-tillage farming would offset, 104 experts suggest that farmers who sequester carbon through "no-till" techniques could reduce total carbon dioxide emissions by twenty percent per year. They could then sell those credits on a commodity market. 105 In the end, the entrepreneurial question in GHG reductions is; how can one generate carbon credits at the lowest possible cost and sell them at the highest price.
Texana Timber has found an answer to this question using rice paddies. The Texas-based company has always practiced sustainable forestry on its modest timber holdings but has begun to use its expertise in forestry economics to venture into a sequestration strategy that creates multiple environmental and economic benefits. In order to gain credits for carbon sequestration, timber must be planted on land that has been vacant for thirteen years (the stipulation called "additionality" makes the foresting of vacant land, such as cattle grazing fields more economically viable). And in order to maximize this carbon benefit, Texana doesn't acquire just any land; the company acquires and converts rice fields into stands of new trees. This creates credits for both carbon sequestered in the trees and methane averted by ceasing rice production. Further, the rice fields have the added operational benefits of being heavily fertilized and the ability to be diked for flooding to maintain growth in times of drought. And they have the added environmental benefit of creating habitat for wildlife. The company has taken this strategy and begun to offer it as a service, courting investors and partners. These companies -in need of carbon credits to achieve reduction goals -provide capital to acquire the land. Texana repays the capital with interest and gives the company the carbon credits. In exchange, Texana retains the land and the timber revenue. The key to the success of this economic model, says CEO Jack Fields is vigorous accounting and verification systems to be developed.
And he has retained a forestry economist and a leading biologist from Rice University to develop such systems. "There is some very good news about the climate problem: we do not need to worry about how the climate science turns out or whether this is a real problem or not because we ought to do the same things about it anyway just to save money. The obstacles to achieving this profitable resolution are not technological or economic. Rather, they are cultural and procedural. They are what economists call 'market failures' -the silly rules and practices that do not mean anyone is dumb, but rather that the normal way we do things does not let us use energy in a way that saves money. Obsolete rules-of-thumb used throughout engineering practice are typically wrong by half to one order of magnitude compared with whole system life-cycle optimization, because they're optimizing a little piece of the system and therefore pessimizing the whole system. Most of our building design is 'infectious repetitis,' not real engineering or architecture at all -partly because architects and engineers are rewarded for what they spend, not for what they save. Similarly our utilities, in almost every jurisdiction, are rewarded for selling more energy and penalized for cutting your bill. We have split incentives between builders and buyers of equipment or buildings, and between landlords and tenants. If you invest to save energy in your operations or home, you probably want your money back about ten times as fast as utilities want their money back from building power plants. This ten-fold difference in discount rate is equivalent to about a ten-fold price distortion." 108 The organizational message in Mr. Lovins' point is two fold. First, realizing the strategic benefits in GHG reductions requires a change in the structure and culture of the organization: reward systems, training, management philosophy, employee involvement, reporting requirements, data collection and analysis, etc. Companies must engage workers as partners in identifying and enacting strategies for reducing their GHG emissions. For example, Ontario Power Generation challenged employees to come up with GHG solutions, yielding suggestions that cut its internal energy needs by more than 2,000 gigawatts per hour and saving $90 million in energy costs. 109 The Beer Store engaged their truck drivers in identifying ways to reduce GHG emissions through things like idling time, speed and transmission shifting patterns. Then it provided an education program that taught drivers how to drive more fuel efficiently. 110 And PHH Arval offers client seminars to teach about the benefits of automobile fleet allocation with respect to carbon dioxide emissions.
Second, the adoption of greenhouse emissions strategies can improve the morale of the company and thereby increase the retention rates of skilled workers, lower the costs of recruiting and training new ones, and attract and retain higher caliber applicants.
An analysis by the Pew Center on Global Climate Change found that GHG reductions motivated employees and drove innovation within companies studied. 111 In short, GHG reductions can be an opportunity to increase workplace productivity. Novo Nordisk, a
Danish pharmaceuticals company, has seen its turnover rate drop to five percent, half the industry average since it initiated its "Values in Action" program as a way to infuse sustainability principles into its strategy. 112 The outdoor company, Patagonia claims to have 5,000 applicants for each opening, due in large part to its strong environmental and social mission. Such organizational initiatives are difficult to quantify in economic terms, yet they are real.
Conclusion
Many today are asking whether it "pays to be green." But the question is too simple in its presentation. It is synonymous with asking whether it pays to innovate. The question is the wrong one. The correct question asks whether there exists an economic opportunity for your company to be green vis-à-vis your competitors and then asks how and when that opportunity can best be achieved. Today, many companies still see climate change as a scientific or social issue. Yet, the reality is that it has the strong potential to be strategic in nature. And as international requirements under the Kyoto Protocol begin to emerge and the U.S. continues to sit on the side lines, it is wise business strategy to use this period to reflect on whether your company can benefit from a voluntary reduction program that can mesh with its strategic objectives. Controls on GHG emissions represent a market transition; one that will affect companies differentially. It will yield winners and losers. Some industries will be at greater risk than others. Thus, the issue pits those with an interest in resisting and trying to delay GHG reductions against those who will try to capitalize on them. In order to realize the extent to which your company will be on the winning or losing side, whether you should be embracing or resisting voluntary GHG reductions, comes down to an understanding of your GHG exposure. It will be based on the answers to questions with which most corporate managers are as yet unfamiliar (see Further, companies that are heavy emitters may see a benefit by avoiding GHG reductions because they will not have to buy pollution permits or invest in new technology. Or looking more deeply, a more important question may be whether the company is near the limits of efficiency in its operations. In reality, it is the most energy and carbon inefficient companies that have the most potential for environmental and economic gain. The entire questions boils down to how GHG emission reductions affect the cost of their operations vis-à-vis their competitors.
Going further, utilities that can recover costs of operational changes will be more likely to adopt GHG reduction programs than those that cannot, as the uncertainty of the return on investment is minimized. Those that are more heavily invested in natural gas may be more inclined than those heavily invested in coal. (Those companies that are more invested in nuclear or renewable energy sources will also be more likely to support mandatory GHG controls as they will raise the costs for their fossil-fuel burning competitors.) Companies that exist in mature markets with little opportunity for process or product substitutes will be more likely to resist GHG reductions than those in evolving markets where alternatives are available for achieving reduction goals. And, those companies that supply industry sectors that embrace GHG reductions will hold a more favorable view of GHG reductions than those that service the more resistant fields.
These are just a few variables by which winners and losers may be decided; those for which the proposition that it can pay to be green is more feasible. And once that determination is made, it is important to consider how companies can build on their strategic opportunities, creating synergistic benefits among multiple efforts. Take, for example, the FedEx diesel-hybrid delivery truck. If the company shifts its entire fleet to this type of drive train, it can possibly reduce transport operations costs and carbon dioxide emissions. Then it could sell its reduction credits on the open market at a profit or use them to offset any reductions that must be made in other areas of operations (such as air transport). In both cases, there are distinct financial benefits. Further, there will be a simultaneous reduction in particulate and sulfur dioxide emissions, which would yield advantages should new emission standards for diesel trucks be promulgated by the EPA.
Going further still, the company could hasten the development of such regulations by lobbying the government with proof that emissions reductions are technically feasible.
Finally, the company may find a boost in morale from drivers who derive personal satisfaction from driving such trucks and they may find a boost in demand from consumers who may wish to do business with a company that takes such progressive steps. Of course, the strategic analysis would not be complete without considering the potential dangers if the company finished shifting its entire fleet to diesel-hybrid and an alternative technology, such as fuel cells, were to make a break through. These are the dangers in any market and technology transition. (Although it is important to note that unless the hydrogen for the fuel cell is created from something other than fossil fuels, the change in GHG emissions may not be negative).
The future is uncertain both in terms of U.S. involvement in Kyoto and the strategic implications of GHG reductions. It is a time for strategic thinking. As we look forward and alleviate that uncertainty, both the academic researcher and the executive manager have something to offer. For the academic researcher, there is a great need for more systematic assessments of the costs and benefits of voluntary GHG reductions. The examples in this article are many but they are anecdotal and cut across many industry sectors. A more thorough causal examination between the strategies employed and financial performance achieved will be extremely influential in fostering more activity in the business and policy arenas. For the executive manager, timing may be crucial and waiting for the results of such a study may negate opportunities that exist now. So, to identify opportunities in strategic climate change strategies, companies must begin with the most simple of measurements to determine the extent of GHG emissions possible and therefore the exposure and alternatives available for reduction. Then managers must take those measurements and craft more sophisticated strategic plans in a GHG market of pollution, credits, capital and abatement technology. • Do you know how to conduct commodity trading of GHG emissions and are you aware of government subsidies for efforts to reduce GHG emissions? Improving Risk Management
• Are any of your operations at risk due to the natural consequences of climate change and do you know the financial implications of that exposure? • Do you know how to quantify your emissions and the financial liabilities they may incur should a GHG disclosure scheme go into force? Elevating Corporate Reputation
• How is your company's market reputation improved or harmed by its posture towards GHG reductions?
• Do you have good relations with key constituencies that care about that posture? Identifying New Market Opportunities
• Are there alternative product or process lines that you could be exploring that will become more attractive as GHG reduction programs proliferate? • Are there products or services (including GHG credits) that your company can sell to other companies who have decided to embark on voluntary GHG reduction programs? Enhancing Human Resource Management
• Are your employees concerned about GHG emissions?
• Would voluntary reduction initiatives improve morale, increase the retention rates of skilled workers, lower the costs of recruiting and training new ones, or attract and retain higher caliber applicants? a North American Industry Classification System Code in parentheses. b Carbon dioxide emitted from energy inputs used to produce electricity (including associated losses), derived by calculating the manufacturing sector share of the electric power sector's total carbon dioxide emissions based upon the weighted share of electricity retail sales (receipts by) the manufacturing sector. c Includes all other types of energy that respondents indicated were consumed or allocated, such as asphalt for road oil, lubricants, naptha, waxes and miscellaneous nonfuel products.
